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COMMUNITY 
Human persons find themselves placed 
in a variety of relationships and associa-
tions with one another. These relation-
ships and associations constitute commu-
nity to the extent that they enable those 
who are so related to share common inter-
ests, intentions, purposes, sentiments, or 
understanding, and/or to participate in 
common activities. Although "commu-
nity" can be treated in certain contexts as 
synonymous with "society," it is frequently 
taken. to encompass bonds of affective and 
personal commitment among its members 
that enable their interactions and relation-
ships to be conceived in terms that are less 
formally and institutionally structured -
than those generally connoted by the term 
"society." In this use, "community" still in-
cludes reference to the range of human as-
sociations and relationships for which 
society is considered to provide a more for-
mal institutional structure. 
When "community" is understood in 
this most generic sense, a person can be a 
participant in more than one community; 
these various communities can be differ-
entiated from one another with respect 
to what they enable their participants to 
share. One can thus belong, at the same 
time, to the cultural community of one's 
ethnic and linguistic heritage, to the civic 
community of this town or nation, to the 
intimate community of one's family and 
friends, to the worshiping community of 
this congregation or parish, to the working 
community of one's particular occupa-
tion, trade, or profession, as well as to any 
number of communities delimited by 
their participants' shared interests and ac-
tivities in art, music, sports, and the like. 
In this context of multiple participation, 
the particular communities of which one 
is a member may each carry d ifferent 
weight with reference to the fundamental 
moral significance and function of com-
munity. "Community" can be defined, in 
this .sense, as that set of relationships that 
provides the primary locus for the forma-
tion of a person's identity as a moral agent 
in relation to all others; this formation 
encompasses the development of those 
modes of understanding, intention, affec-
tion, and action that enable one to partici-
pate in the activities that sustain the 
relationships that provide the bases for 
the community' s existence, identity, and 
attainment of its end(s). 
In its presentation and explication of 
the moral significance and function of 
community, Catholic social thought has 
developed particular emphases upon 
themes that show how community stands 
in direct and intrinsic relationship to a 
proper and adequate understanding of the 
human person. The philosophical exposi-
tion of these themes, generally set within a 
conceptual framework of natural law, ·has 
most often given primary focus to con-
cepts, considerations, and arguments that 
(I) explicate and ground the claim that 
human persons are intrinsically social and 
(2) elaborate the implications this claim 
has for the ordering of human social activ-
ity. These implications have been framed 
principally in terms of the constitution 
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and function of social institutions and the 
delimitation of the ways that members of 
a community appropriately participate in 
the workings of such institutions. Among 
these institutions the family takes pri-
macy as "a kind of school of deeper hu- ....1-
manity" and "the foundation of society" 
(Gaudium et spes 52). The theological ex-
position of these themes has principally 
clustered around a varied but interrelated 
set of concepts, images, and symbols-for 
example, creation, covenant, koinonia, 
kingdom of God-that also affirm an in-
trinsically-social character to human exis-
tence but that also explicitly root this 
human exigency toward community in the 
graciousness of God's salvific activity. In 
consequence, the church receives special 
consideration within this theological ex-
posi tion, since it is understood as the 
community that preeminently owes its 
existence to God's salvific initiatives 
(Lumen gentium 2). 
Within both philosophical and theolog-
ical expositions of the moral significance 
and function of community, the concept 
of the dignity of the human person has 
played an especially prominent role. The 
Genesis account (I :26-27) of the creation 
of the human person in God's image 
(imago Dei) stands as the starting point 
for theological treatment of the concept of 
human dignity (GS 12; ~conomic Justice 
for A/132). Three aspects of this treatment 
are of particular importance in the elabo-
ration of the intrinsically social character 
of human existence and its rootedness 
in God's salvific activity: ( l) an insistence 
that the full acknowledgment and 
achievement of this dignity for individu-
als is possible only within the context of 
each one's membership and participation 
in the life of a community (GS 24-27); (2) 
the correlation of the source of human 
dignity in God's gracious act of creation 
with the final destiny-sharing in God's 
own life- to which humanity is called and 
which requires the active cooperation of 
human persons (GS 34; Popu/orum pro-
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gressio l 5-17); (3) the identification of 
the conditions for the acknowledgment 
and attainment of this dignity with the 
protection of the full range-political, 
economic, and social-of human rights 
and with the exercise of the corresponding 
responsibilities to others that these rights 
entail (Pacem in terris 35). 
To the extent that Catholic social 
thought has cast its philosophical discus-
sion of the intrinsically social character of 
the human person in terms of Aristotelian 
and Thomistic categories, it has viewed 
the concept of human dignity and its bear-
ing upon the moral significance and func-
tion of community in terms of a finality 
that is inherent to human persons. This fi-
nality has its ultimate focus upon the at-
tainment of a personal communion with 
God that enables and perfects our com-
munion with one another as well as with 
the whole order of creation; it also encom-
passes a range of specific and limited 
goods that play an essential role in the 
constitution of the authentic human good 
possible for us to attain within the finite 
conditions of human existence (GS 39). 
This finality also assigns to the common 
good a special ordering function in the at-
tainment of the authentic human good, 
particularly with respect to the concrete 
workings of human social, political, and 
economic institutions. As an ordering 
principle, the common good is neither 
the mere sum total of the goods sought by 
individuals nor is it the good of the 
whole- be it a particular community or 
the entire human species-for which indi-
vidual parts may be sacrificed. " It is the 
good human life of the multitude, of a 
multitude of persons; it is their commu-
nion in good living. It is therefore com-
mon to both the whole and the parts into 
which it flows back and which, in turn, 
must benefit from it" (Maritain, p. 41 ). 
This placement of the meaning and at-
tainment of human dignity within an ac-
count of human good, which aspires to 
comprehend its plurality through the or-
dering principle of the common good; 
stands in contrast with an understanding 
of the dignity of the person that takes the 
freedom of individuals to make their own 
choices to be its central, if not sole, consti-
tutive feature. This latter understanding 
of human dignity has played an important 
role in the establishment and operation of 
the institutions of Western liberal democ-
racy: autonomy, that is, the freedom of in-
dividual self-determination, functions as 
a central conceptual underpinning for the 
social-contract views that have generally 
been taken, in popular as well as academic 
argument, as both the morally appropri-
ate and practically persuasive justifica-
tion for these institutions and for the 
individual's participation in them. One 
consequence of such social-contract views 
has been to place the exercise of an indi-
vidual's freedom of self-dett:rmination in 
strong tension, if not inevitable conflict, 
with the responsibilities that membership 
in a community and participation in its 
institutions entail for the individual. In 
particular, to the extent that contractarian 
views make the moral significance and 
function of social relationships turn upon 
questions of whether and to what extent 
the origin of such relationships lies in the 
free self-determination of individuals, 
these views also place at the moral periph-
ery one's membership and participation 
in communities whose bonds of relation-
ship' are matters that are not readily and 
simply subject to free self-determination, 
for example, ties of family, language, eth-
nicity, and culture. 
The mutual and intrinsic relationship 
of community to the value and dignity of 
the person, which is central in the devel-
opment of Catholic social thought, has 
provided a basis for both the implicit and 
explicit criticisms that church pronounce-
ments have made of both the contrac-
tarian understanding of the social rela-
tionships that undergird human commu-
nity and the atomistic individualism it 
serves to encourage (e.g. , PT 78; GS 74; 
.Octogesima adveniens 26, 35). These criti-
cisms are set within a framework that ac-
knowledges the value offreely undertaken 
human associations and the centrality of 
consent for the moral legitimacy of politi-
cal authority within any particular human 
community (GS 75; OA 45-46). Presup-
posed is an understanding of the dynam-
ics of human freedom in which the value 
of the exercise of human freedom is mea-
sured not merely by its satisfaction of the 
principle of individual autonomy but also 
by its congruence with an intrinsic order-
ing of human persons to participation in 
common good. 
The understanding of the dynamics of 
human freedom that is presupposed in 
Catholic social thought on community 
has been paralleled in important ways by a 
set of challenges that a number of think-
ers, both secular and religious, have re-
cently posed to the cultural and academic 
dominance of a contractarian under-
standing of the moral character of social 
relationships. These challenges have fre-
quently been taken to function as a "com-
munitarian" critique of contractarian 
views. Consonant with an affirmation of 
an intrinsic mutual relationship between 
the persons and community, these authors 
have encouraged a retrieval of the idea of 
common good: the "public argument" 
(Murray, p. 8) that constitutes the civic 
and civil moral conversation at the heart 
of the reflective life of a community must 
have the common good as its focus, partic-
ularly as that argument bears upon deci-
sions and actions that affect the life and 
well being of each and all the members of 
· the community. 
In addition to encouraging this re-
trieval of the common good, certain ver-
sions of the communitarian critique have 
also proposed a narrative mode of under-
standing as the most appropriate way to 
comprehend the structure of the intrinsic 
mutual relationship between persons and 
community. Within this mode of under-
standing, learning the narratives that ex-
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hibit the finalities embedded in the con-
stitutive practices of the community and 
acquiring the skills requisite for participa-
tion in those practices are the primary ac-
tivities that shape a person's identity-
most crucially, one's identity as a moral 
agent. The moral identity of persons is 
thus primarily located by reference to the 
practices, including those of reflective 
inquiry, in which one participates as a 
member of a particular community and 
which constitute that community's moral 
tradition. 
The narrative approach to understand-
ing community as the matrix for the for-
mation of the moral identity of its mem-
bers frequently places great stress upon 
the historical particularity of the moral 
tradition that the practices of any commu-
nity embody; in consequence, its account 
of community stands vulnerable to 
charges that it does not offer an adequate 
basis upon which universal moral claims 
that bind all persons can be pressed. This 
criticism, on the philosophical side, sees 
in the narrative approach no more than 
yet another formulation of moral relativ-
ism; on the theological side, it sees the 
narrative approach limiting the applica-
bility of crucial Christian moral claims to 
those who are within the ambit of sectar-
ian community. 
However, this narrative- approach also 
offers possibilities for enriching a number 
of the concepts and themes involved in 
the continuing development of Catholic 
thought on community. For instance, this 
approach helps to underscore the impor-
tance that the church, precisely as a wor-
shiping community, plays in the formation 
of moral identity. The enacted events, im-
ages, and stories that constitute the wor-
ship of the Christian community mediate 
to its participants the salvific activity of 
God and have power to shape the moral 
agency of those who worship so that their 
dispositions, actions, and affections may 
more and more be drawn into accord with 
the responsive pattern of agency that is 
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most fully exhibited in Jesus Christ. A sec-
ond possibility for enrichment lies in the 
accounts of the dynamics of tradition that 
the narrative approach has been required 
to develop in response to criticism that the 
historical particularity of the moral prac-
tice and the reflective moral inquiry of any 
community does not offer an adequate 
basis on which to press universal moral 
claims. Of particular interest are those ac-
counts (e.g., Alasdair Macintyre's Whose 
Justice? Which Rationality.'!) in which 
maintaining and developing a viable moral 
tradition requires commitment, on the 
part of those who represent the traditions 
of their particular communities, to sustain 
and take part in a continuing public con-
versation with one another about our com-
mon human good, that is, a commitment 
to engage in what John Courtney Murray 
characterizes as "public argument." 
There are a number. of other current 
philosophical and theological discussions 
that also offer potential resources for the 
enrichment of Catholic thought on com-
munity. Three that deserve particular at-
tention can be briefly noted here. First, 
theological proposals to interpret the rela-
tions among the persons of the Trinity on 
the model of community suggest that the 
fundamentally social character of the 
human person created in the image of God 
has its roots not just in God's act of cre-
ation but also in the Trinitarian life of 
God. Second, both feminist and liberation 
thinkers have explored the positive and the 
negative dimensions of the ways in which 
the social location of individuals, the ideo-
logical commitments embedded in a par-
ticular culture, and the structure of rela-
tionships of power within a society all 
function in the formation of the identity of 
persons. Although they join their voices to 
the sharp criticism that Catholic social 
thought has leveled at contractarian under-
standings of social relationships having 
atomistic individualism at their base, fem-
inist and liberation thinkers also fault 
Catholic thought for containing under-
standings of community that presuppose 
hierarchical models for the structuring of 
social institutions and relationships. These 
models are seen as inevitably functioning 
to exclude those at the margins of commu-
nity from participation in the determina-
tion of their own destinies. An important 
basis for such criticism has been a model of 
human connectedness in which solidarity 
with those who are powerless and outcast 
forms a touchstone with which to test the 
moral adequacy of a community's institu-
tions and practices. Third, ecological and 
environmental concerns have suggested 
significant ways in which our thinking 
about community may need to include not 
only our relationships to one another as 
persons but also our relationships to all an-
imate life and its environing world. 
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